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counterinsurgency

Soldier Spotlight

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Chief Petty Officer Jeremy Torrisi

MARSOC corpsman receives Silver Star Medal for heroics in Afghanistan | Marines.mil

By Cpl. Richard Blumenstein, Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command 

MARINE CORPS BASE CAMP LEJEUNE, N.C.  — “You hear your buddies go down …You close your eyes… You think about everything … You hear you’re the only other corpsman. What would you do?”

Chief Petty Officer Jeremy K. Torrisi, a hospital corpsman with U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Special Operations Command, faced that question June 26, 2008 in the mountains of Afghanistan during the fiercest firefight of his life.

Torrisi saved the lives of four of his comrades and received the Silver Star Medal at the Courthouse Bay Gymnasium on Jan 21.

So far, one Navy Cross, two Silver Star Medals, and two Bronze Star Medals with combat distinguishing devices have been awarded in the battle’s aftermath.  

“I’m the one getting recognized today, but everybody knows, I hope, the story that went down that day; it wasn’t one person, it wasn’t two, it wasn’t three, it was everybody,” Torrisi said during the award ceremony. “Everybody doing their part. We have a lot of guys around today walking, talking, and breathing because of that. I was just part of the well-oiled machine that we were.”

Read about the battle HERE

Wikileaks: Good, Bad or Indifferent

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The Wikileaks story is headlining big across all media outlets. But why? Is it because all of this information was released? Is it because some sort of secret information would be found? In a few words: Who cares?

Some argue that this is big. But, when you really take the time to look at the material, you see that all this hub-bub is over yesterdays news. Also, a list of people that are wanted. What’s the harm in that? After all, it isn’t a look into some sort of galactically top secret operation.

Only time will tell how good, bad or indifferent this leak is. After all, remember how bad it was when the McChrystal affair was leaked? We can only hope that the leeching lawyers like John Kerry don’t start prosecuting soldiers.

British Sniper Craig Harrison Breaks Record

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As posted by DailyMail.co.uk

An army sniper has earned a place in military history by killing two Taliban machine gunners from more than a mile and a half away.

Craig Harrison’s record breaking shots felled the insurgents with consecutive bullets  –  even though they were 3,200ft beyond the official range of his rifle.

The Household Cavalry veteran’s kills from a distance of 8,120ft beat the previous record by 150ft.

He was using the British-built L115A3 Long Range Rifle, the Army’s most powerful sniper weapon.

He was so far away that the 8.59mm-calibre bullets took almost three seconds to reach their target. Scores of Taliban gunmen h-ve fallen to the gun which has been nicknamed The Silent Assassin.

It is only designed to be effective at up to 4,921ft – just less than a mile – and capable of only ‘ harassing fire’ beyond that range.

But Corporal Harrison took his record-breaking shots after his commander and Afghan soldiers were attacked during a patrol in Helmand in November last year.

His vehicle was further back on a ridge, with his sights trained on a Taliban compound. He said: ‘We saw two insurgents running through its courtyard. They came forward carrying a machine gun and opened fire on the commander’s wagon.

‘Conditions were perfect, no wind, mild weather, clear visibility.

‘The first round hit a machine gunner in the stomach. He went straight down and didn’t move. The second insurgent grabbed the weapon and my second shot hit him in the side.’

The previous sniper record, 7,972ft, was held by a Canadian soldier.

Corporal Harrison, a married father-of-one from Cheltenham, Gloucestershire, killed 12 more rebels and wounded seven others. During an extraordinary six-month tour of duty he also survived a bullet that went though his helmet and a roadside bomb.

The blast broke both his arms but he was eventually able to return to duty, his accuracy unaffected.

Live Coverage of Taliban Attacks Banned By Afghanistan

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While there has been a draw-down in Marjah, changes are beginning to take shape. One major change is that Afghanistan has banned live coverage of the Taliban attacks, saying that it enables the enemy. This has been a source of concern during the entire war on terror in Iraq and Afghanistan alike. The constant feed of news is finally being slowed to ensure not to help defeat the advancement of liberty.

Reuters – Afghanistan bans coverage of Taliban attacks

The announcement came on a day when the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) fighting the Taliban reported six of its service members had been killed in various attacks.

Journalists will be allowed to film only the aftermath of attacks, when given permission by the National Directorate of Security (NDS) spy agency, the agency said. Journalists who film while attacks are under way will be held and their gear seized.

“Live coverage does not benefit the government, but benefits the enemies of Afghanistan,” NDS spokesman Saeed Ansari said. The agency summoned a group of reporters to announce the ban.

The move was denounced by Afghan journalism and rights groups, which said it would deprive the public of vital information about the security situation during attacks.

One could accept the argument made by the journalists, however, if it is helping aid the enemy by providing the public information then the journalists should wait to share their story. The only objection one could make is if the locals are in immediate danger.

Another change being seen in the Marjah region, is that of the people and their understanding of just what type of action is being taken.

AssociatedPress – Afghan complaints show obstacles ahead in war

An Afghan government delegation from Kabul, headed by Vice President Karim Khalili, made its initial foray to the town to meet with some 300 tribal elders and residents at the largest shura, or council meeting, since coalition troops seized control of Marjah last month.

NATO military commander Gen. Stanley McChrystal and civilian chief Mark Sedwill came along in a sign that international forces intend to support the Afghan government’s efforts in the troubled south.

“The most important thing is to bring peace and stability to the people in Afghanistan,” Khalili told the residents. “This is a promise. … It’s our priority to talk to each other. But others want to prevent this. We will not allow them to keep people hostage again. This is a beginning in Marjah. We will be with you. We will stay and fight. We will bring you good governance.”

But the townspeople appeared skeptical — and some were angry.

An elderly man, wearing a gray turban, stood up to say that his family members had been killed during the military operation, although he didn’t say by whom.

After offering his condolences, Khalili reached out to embrace him and promised some money and assistance to his family.

Another elderly man, dressed in a white turban and blue tunic, complained that his house was destroyed during the offensive.

“You promised not to use big weapons. Why was my house destroyed?” he asked.

He invited the delegation to visit his home nearby.

The allied forces have cleared most of Marjah and are now working to secure the area, though NATO has warned there could be pockets of violence for weeks. Hundreds of Afghan police and civil servants are being brought in with the goal of establishing public services to win the support of the population.

NATO officials say establishing good local governance is key, because corruption and lack of services have led many Afghans to turn to the Taliban.

“We need to move fast enough to try to meet expectations. But carefully enough that we’re not party to being blind to some of the nuances,” McChrystal told reporters. “The key thing is to get the locals represented and shape it the way they want because they’ll know best. In the near term, they have to feel represented. They have to feel it’s fair.”

For more commentary:

The Networked Enemy; The New Way of War

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Everyday people are studying the actions and commands of the forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, trying to understand not only the American forces but also those of the enemy. One such idea that does not seem to be going away is that of the age of information. When used correctly it can be the deciding factor.

John Arquilla, writer at Foreign Policy, took a look into this very issue:

Even the implications of maturing tanks, planes, and the radio waves that linked them were only partially understood by the next generation of military men. Just as their predecessors failed to grasp the lethal nature of firepower, their successors missed the rise of mechanized maneuver — save for the Germans, who figured out that blitzkrieg was possible and won some grand early victories. They would have gone on winning, but for poor high-level strategic choices such as invading Russia and declaring war on the United States. In the end, the Nazis were not so much outfought as gang-tackled.

Nuclear weapons were next to be misunderstood, most monumentally by a U.S. military that initially thought they could be employed like any other weapons. But it turned out they were useful only in deterring their use. Surprisingly, it was cold warrior Ronald Reagan who had the keenest insight into such weapons when he said, “A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.”

Which brings us to war in the age of information. The technological breakthroughs of the last two decades — comparable in world-shaking scope to those at the Industrial Revolution’s outset two centuries ago — coincided with a new moment of global political instability after the Cold War. Yet most militaries are entering this era with the familiar pattern of belief that new technological tools will simply reinforce existing practices.

In the U.S. case, senior officials remain convinced that their strategy of “shock and awe” and the Powell doctrine of “overwhelming force” have only been enhanced by the addition of greater numbers of smart weapons, remotely controlled aircraft, and near-instant global communications. Perhaps the most prominent cheerleader for “shock and awe” has been National Security Advisor James Jones, the general whose circle of senior aides has included those who came up with the concept in the 1990s. Their basic idea: “The bigger the hammer, the better the outcome.”

Nothing could be further from the truth, as the results in Iraq and Afghanistan so painfully demonstrate. Indeed, a decade and a half after my colleague David Ronfeldt and I coined the term “netwar” to describe the world’s emerging form of network-based conflict, the United States is still behind the curve. The evidence of the last 10 years shows clearly that massive applications of force have done little more than kill the innocent and enrage their survivors. Networked organizations like al Qaeda have proven how easy it is to dodge such heavy punches and persist to land sharp counterblows.

While it is a good article, the one thing it does not address is the ability for a force as large and complex as that of the United States to utilize the ability to use the network-based communication idea and apply it against the enemy.

That is the one advantage the Taliban and Al-Qaeda have over the American forces. They are smaller and network, or communicate, better between each other while American forces are left to wait for information to filter down through its complex command structure. The current age of technology has been proven as an avenue to dispense information. Social media sites have taken over as an informal way to share information, and it is only a matter of time for a more secure means to surface.

Strategic Withdrawl; An Enabled Enemy

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In the current age of information, both the internet and 24/7 news agencies have created an open window into the policies and strategies of the American way. This has been very detrimental to the strategy of advancing in places like the Afghan region. Reason being, it has enabled the enemy as to when and where the next mission will take the American forces.

ForeignPolicy – Strategic Withdrawl

Top 3 Reasons The Obama Surge Fails

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On tuesday, Dec. 1, President Obama finally decided on a direction for Afghanistan. Along with his decision, came many opinions on the speech. Everything from talking about how good or bad the delivery was, to how many troops, to why we need to continue efforts in Afghanistan.

Whether those opinions are of heavy value or not, in summary, here are the top 3 reasons why Obama’s plan fails.

1. Troop Levels

While it did take months to decide on a direction, his minimalistic approach to troop levels has been a concern since the leak of the General McChrystal assessment. The minimum number of troops requested by McChrystal was 40,000, but Obama will be deploying only 30,000. This alone demonstrates that Obama does not have complete trust in his General. This could be due to his lack of military service and what it truly takes to carry out a mission of the magnitude he expressed during the speech.

2. Time Tables

The announcement of time tables are a ridiculous way to fight a war, with the simple fact that you do not freely give your enemy a front row seat to what you will do and when you will do it. Now, not only does the enemy know how many more opposition they will encounter, but they also know when they will get there. Worse yet, they also know that after those 30,000 troops get there, they will only have to fight them for roughly a year or so.

The other side to the time table factor is that troops will begin deploying back home in the year 2011. The importance to that year is when troops begin coming back home, debate among 2012 presidentail candidates will be heavily engaged.

3. Political Influence

During his farwell address, President Dwight D. Eisenhower offered a prophetic warning when he said:

“In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.”

With application to what is being done in direction to Afhganistan, Obama is warrenting a misplaced power. A power, that in time of war, should and has fallen on the shoulders and conscience of the Generals in charge of battle. With total disregard to the needs of McChrystal, this will politically end disastrous as did Vietnam.

For more commentary:

Afghanistan: From Strategy to Comparison

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Among the most heavily debated issues in Washington, none is more prevalent than what the next steps and actions will be in Afghanistan. From an addition of 40.000 troops, to a slow and deliberate pullout of troops in favor of strategic air strikes, President Obama definitely has to make a difficult decision. A decision that many hope will not take too much longer, and one that will receive more attention than what it has in the last few weeks.

Whatever the decision shall be, Obama has another thing weighing down his shoulders with Afghanistan. That would be the parallels between Afghanistan and Vietnam. In commentary at RAND Corporation that originally appeared at The Huffington Post, James Dobbins shares the same concern.

Here are a few things from his commentary that shed some light on this issue:

Beyond that, polls are showing that Americans are increasingly skeptical about this conflict, and citizens of other nations contributing troops, such as Britain, Germany, Canada, and the Netherlands, are even more negative.

Does any of this sound familiar?

Now that U.S. involvement in Iraq has finally begun to require fewer resources, Afghanistan is the new focus of American and European anti-war sentiment, and increasingly Obama’s critics are drawing on the analogy of Vietnam. They assert that the United States and its allies are bogged down in a long, inconclusive conflict in support of a corrupt and incompetent government against an elusive, popularly based enemy operating out of an untouchable cross-border sanctuary.

In fact, the two societies, Vietnamese and Afghan, and the two insurgencies, Viet Cong and Taliban, could hardly be more different. Yet the conflicts may, in the end, have a similar impact on American public opinion. And that could have a similar impact on their outcomes. The most decisive battles over Vietnam were fought for the heart and minds of the American people and the most decisive defeat was in the U.S. Congress. The contest for Afghanistan is now being conducted over this same terrain.

For years, the war in Iraq diverted resources from Afghanistan. Obama has characterized Afghanistan as a war of necessity, in contrast to Iraq, a war of choice—and a bad one at that. Yet as controversy over Iraq fades, this comparison, perhaps accurate and certainly powerful in its time, has dwindling impact. In its place is a new controversy, Afghanistan as the new Vietnam.

There’s no debate about how that war turned out, but little agreement on why. The insurgency in South Vietnam had been reduced to manageable proportions by the time American troops departed in 1973. Counterinsurgency thus largely succeeded, yet the war was still lost when North Vietnam launched a conventional invasion in 1975. Vietnam thus offers material for both sides in current debate over troop levels in Afghanistan. Those who argue for a better resourced counterinsurgency campaign can point to the tactical and operations successes in Vietnam. Opponents recall the strategic failure.

To read Mr. Dobbins commentary in its entirety, please visit RAND Corporation.

General McChrystal’s Assessment In Afghanistan

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U.S. Army General Stanley A. McChrystal submitted his initial assessment of the rising conflict in Afghanistan to President Barack Obama. Aside from the fact that this certain report was leaked to the media, this is nothing new. Commanders are always submitting their situation report (SITREP), or in this case, initial assessment as Gen. McChrystal has been in current command since June 15, 2009.

Assuming command of an already controversial conflict in Afghanistan, Gen. McChrystal observed that “The situation in Afghanistan is serious; neither success nor failure can be taken for granted. Although considerable effort and sacrifice have resulted in some progress, many indicators suggest the overall situation is deteriorating.” With a grasp of the overall attitude and direction, his assessment is full of information that would be useful to the administration in determining the future involvement of American forces.

Redefining the Fight

This is a different kind of fight. We must conduct classic counterinsurgency operations in an environment that is uniquely complex.

Our strategy cannot be focused on seizing terrain or destroying insurgent forces; our objective must be the population.

Not a stranger to desert warfare, as he was part of both Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm, his understanding of history and the inner workings of classic counterinsurgency operations, Gen. McChrystal could be treading down a failed path similar to that of Vietnam. The two conflicts are similar in many ways. Both were highly debated conflicts in the start, and heavily contested during. The failed outcome of Vietnam, in many eyes, would not be a path many Americans are willing to go down.

Another commonality, their uniquely complex environments. Where Vietnam was intensely fought in the jungle, Afghanistan is being fought in the mountains and communities. While they are differing terrains, it is how difficult the discernment of friend and foe is that makes the terrain hard to make advancements. Fighting among the population was difficult in Vietnam, and is proving more and more arduous in the Afghan region. The protection of the people is the priority over seizing terrain or destroying insurgents.

Another similarity between Afghanistan and Vietnam, are the short and long-term implications:

We face both a short and long-term fight. The long-term fight will require patience and commitment, but I believe the short-term fight will be decisive. Failure to gain the initiative and reverse insurgent momentum in the near-term (next 12 months) — while Afghan security capacity matures — risks an outcome where defeating the insugency is no longer possible.

Over the last eight years, the American people has been somewhat patient. However, when defecits mount higher and higher for what seems to be an unending war, their commitment faulters and becomes null. A clear plan must devised to mesh the short-term yet decisive victories with the long-term goal of defeating the insurgency and restoring Afghanistan to its population.

To accomplish this measure, Gen. McChrystal proposes a focus be placed on two principle areas:

  1. Change the operational culture to connect with the people.
  2. Improve unity of effort and command.

Taking care of the people will most definately improve unity effort and command. Without the population focused on the effort to shield and protect them from the insurgents, there cannot be a relationship with the Afghan command and their unifying hand in controlling the violence. Certainly, taking care of the people will ease the burden on the command and their efforts.

Gen. McChrystal outlines that “These concepts are not new. However, implemented aggressivley, they will be revolutionary to our effectiveness.” Correct in that they are not new, but there is some doubt as to its effectiveness. With the majority of both Afghans and Americans in opposition of continuing operations, the outcome of any further actions, however aggressive they may be, would have to not only be sold to the Obama administration, but also to the people of Afghanistan and America. A joint effort on both fronts to combat the insurgents is what could show to be most effective and revolutionary.

General Stanley A. McChrystal’s Initial Assessment