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Vietnam

Top 3 Reasons The Obama Surge Fails

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On tuesday, Dec. 1, President Obama finally decided on a direction for Afghanistan. Along with his decision, came many opinions on the speech. Everything from talking about how good or bad the delivery was, to how many troops, to why we need to continue efforts in Afghanistan.

Whether those opinions are of heavy value or not, in summary, here are the top 3 reasons why Obama’s plan fails.

1. Troop Levels

While it did take months to decide on a direction, his minimalistic approach to troop levels has been a concern since the leak of the General McChrystal assessment. The minimum number of troops requested by McChrystal was 40,000, but Obama will be deploying only 30,000. This alone demonstrates that Obama does not have complete trust in his General. This could be due to his lack of military service and what it truly takes to carry out a mission of the magnitude he expressed during the speech.

2. Time Tables

The announcement of time tables are a ridiculous way to fight a war, with the simple fact that you do not freely give your enemy a front row seat to what you will do and when you will do it. Now, not only does the enemy know how many more opposition they will encounter, but they also know when they will get there. Worse yet, they also know that after those 30,000 troops get there, they will only have to fight them for roughly a year or so.

The other side to the time table factor is that troops will begin deploying back home in the year 2011. The importance to that year is when troops begin coming back home, debate among 2012 presidentail candidates will be heavily engaged.

3. Political Influence

During his farwell address, President Dwight D. Eisenhower offered a prophetic warning when he said:

“In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.”

With application to what is being done in direction to Afhganistan, Obama is warrenting a misplaced power. A power, that in time of war, should and has fallen on the shoulders and conscience of the Generals in charge of battle. With total disregard to the needs of McChrystal, this will politically end disastrous as did Vietnam.

For more commentary:

Afghanistan: From Strategy to Comparison

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Among the most heavily debated issues in Washington, none is more prevalent than what the next steps and actions will be in Afghanistan. From an addition of 40.000 troops, to a slow and deliberate pullout of troops in favor of strategic air strikes, President Obama definitely has to make a difficult decision. A decision that many hope will not take too much longer, and one that will receive more attention than what it has in the last few weeks.

Whatever the decision shall be, Obama has another thing weighing down his shoulders with Afghanistan. That would be the parallels between Afghanistan and Vietnam. In commentary at RAND Corporation that originally appeared at The Huffington Post, James Dobbins shares the same concern.

Here are a few things from his commentary that shed some light on this issue:

Beyond that, polls are showing that Americans are increasingly skeptical about this conflict, and citizens of other nations contributing troops, such as Britain, Germany, Canada, and the Netherlands, are even more negative.

Does any of this sound familiar?

Now that U.S. involvement in Iraq has finally begun to require fewer resources, Afghanistan is the new focus of American and European anti-war sentiment, and increasingly Obama’s critics are drawing on the analogy of Vietnam. They assert that the United States and its allies are bogged down in a long, inconclusive conflict in support of a corrupt and incompetent government against an elusive, popularly based enemy operating out of an untouchable cross-border sanctuary.

In fact, the two societies, Vietnamese and Afghan, and the two insurgencies, Viet Cong and Taliban, could hardly be more different. Yet the conflicts may, in the end, have a similar impact on American public opinion. And that could have a similar impact on their outcomes. The most decisive battles over Vietnam were fought for the heart and minds of the American people and the most decisive defeat was in the U.S. Congress. The contest for Afghanistan is now being conducted over this same terrain.

For years, the war in Iraq diverted resources from Afghanistan. Obama has characterized Afghanistan as a war of necessity, in contrast to Iraq, a war of choice—and a bad one at that. Yet as controversy over Iraq fades, this comparison, perhaps accurate and certainly powerful in its time, has dwindling impact. In its place is a new controversy, Afghanistan as the new Vietnam.

There’s no debate about how that war turned out, but little agreement on why. The insurgency in South Vietnam had been reduced to manageable proportions by the time American troops departed in 1973. Counterinsurgency thus largely succeeded, yet the war was still lost when North Vietnam launched a conventional invasion in 1975. Vietnam thus offers material for both sides in current debate over troop levels in Afghanistan. Those who argue for a better resourced counterinsurgency campaign can point to the tactical and operations successes in Vietnam. Opponents recall the strategic failure.

To read Mr. Dobbins commentary in its entirety, please visit RAND Corporation.

General McChrystal’s Assessment In Afghanistan

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U.S. Army General Stanley A. McChrystal submitted his initial assessment of the rising conflict in Afghanistan to President Barack Obama. Aside from the fact that this certain report was leaked to the media, this is nothing new. Commanders are always submitting their situation report (SITREP), or in this case, initial assessment as Gen. McChrystal has been in current command since June 15, 2009.

Assuming command of an already controversial conflict in Afghanistan, Gen. McChrystal observed that “The situation in Afghanistan is serious; neither success nor failure can be taken for granted. Although considerable effort and sacrifice have resulted in some progress, many indicators suggest the overall situation is deteriorating.” With a grasp of the overall attitude and direction, his assessment is full of information that would be useful to the administration in determining the future involvement of American forces.

Redefining the Fight

This is a different kind of fight. We must conduct classic counterinsurgency operations in an environment that is uniquely complex.

Our strategy cannot be focused on seizing terrain or destroying insurgent forces; our objective must be the population.

Not a stranger to desert warfare, as he was part of both Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm, his understanding of history and the inner workings of classic counterinsurgency operations, Gen. McChrystal could be treading down a failed path similar to that of Vietnam. The two conflicts are similar in many ways. Both were highly debated conflicts in the start, and heavily contested during. The failed outcome of Vietnam, in many eyes, would not be a path many Americans are willing to go down.

Another commonality, their uniquely complex environments. Where Vietnam was intensely fought in the jungle, Afghanistan is being fought in the mountains and communities. While they are differing terrains, it is how difficult the discernment of friend and foe is that makes the terrain hard to make advancements. Fighting among the population was difficult in Vietnam, and is proving more and more arduous in the Afghan region. The protection of the people is the priority over seizing terrain or destroying insurgents.

Another similarity between Afghanistan and Vietnam, are the short and long-term implications:

We face both a short and long-term fight. The long-term fight will require patience and commitment, but I believe the short-term fight will be decisive. Failure to gain the initiative and reverse insurgent momentum in the near-term (next 12 months) — while Afghan security capacity matures — risks an outcome where defeating the insugency is no longer possible.

Over the last eight years, the American people has been somewhat patient. However, when defecits mount higher and higher for what seems to be an unending war, their commitment faulters and becomes null. A clear plan must devised to mesh the short-term yet decisive victories with the long-term goal of defeating the insurgency and restoring Afghanistan to its population.

To accomplish this measure, Gen. McChrystal proposes a focus be placed on two principle areas:

  1. Change the operational culture to connect with the people.
  2. Improve unity of effort and command.

Taking care of the people will most definately improve unity effort and command. Without the population focused on the effort to shield and protect them from the insurgents, there cannot be a relationship with the Afghan command and their unifying hand in controlling the violence. Certainly, taking care of the people will ease the burden on the command and their efforts.

Gen. McChrystal outlines that “These concepts are not new. However, implemented aggressivley, they will be revolutionary to our effectiveness.” Correct in that they are not new, but there is some doubt as to its effectiveness. With the majority of both Afghans and Americans in opposition of continuing operations, the outcome of any further actions, however aggressive they may be, would have to not only be sold to the Obama administration, but also to the people of Afghanistan and America. A joint effort on both fronts to combat the insurgents is what could show to be most effective and revolutionary.

General Stanley A. McChrystal’s Initial Assessment

Afghanistan The Next Vietnam

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The conflict in Afghanistan has proven more difficult to fight recently, even with an increase of American troops. Which has been a cause for conflict among some. For others, they are left wondering whether or not we learned from history, or if we are permitting it to repeat itself.

It is well known that President Barack Obama was in total opposition of the troop surge in Iraq, as well as opposing the republican lead war. Most would agree that it was a war fought along political party lines. Most democrats were against the war in Iraq while republicans were supportive. There is no secret that party officials oppose the other side when it comes to war, unless they are the one leading the effort.

In Vietnam, America was lead to war by a democratic president with opposition coming from the republican party. By the time things began taking a turn for the worst, a republican had taken office and the streets were filled with protesters. They protested everything from the amount of troops that were dying to that it was an unnecessary war.

Either way you look at it, the arguments made a point. There was a large amount of casualties, and it did seem that it was an unnecessary war. Unnecessary in the fact that there seemed to be no true plan. The war wasn’t fought with a clear idea as to what the outcome would be. For many, this rings so true today with the ongoing war in Afghanistan.

With things taking course in Afghanistan, it seems that the Vietnam effect is in true form. It also seems that some history seems to be repeating itself along party lines. A war started by a republican administration, and taken over by a democratic administration has proven to be a challenge. In the start, it was obvious there was opposition with entering Afghanistan. However, things changed once the Obama Administration took charge. With a heavy focus on a draw-down of troop levels in Iraq, there was no sign that there would be an increase of troops in Afghanistan. Since the current administration took over, troop levels have doubled in size and there has been an influx of casualties.

The Vietnam effect doesn’t stop there. As in the past, the administration has no real objective. There has been no real objective other than to get the elusive Osama bin Laden. Is the objective to place a centralized government into operation? If so, then the effort is useless. History has shown that the Afghan people reject this proposal. They have never had a centralized government like what is practiced in America, and it appears as though they never will.

In the ’80’s, Russia made a serious attempt to change the way Afghanistan runs itself. As then, things are proving to be more difficult than expected. However, Mikhail Gorbachev, then Russian leader, was accepting to the fact that they would ultimately not win the engagement. Something the Obama administration seems unwilling to accept, defeat.

Gorbachev, and his administration, saw the course and withdrew his troops from a decade of fighting. American troops have been in the region for almost the same time, however they will soon see an infusion of more troops. As in Vietnam, when things seemed against America, efforts were increased. Only to later be withdrawn in haste.

Vietnam was a heavy burden on America that caused a huge political divide. The conflict in Afghanistan seems to be taking the same course. Facing a political divide, and a huge deficit, the war is taking a turn for the worse. Public opinion is not as divided, but the majority is now against the effort. Deficits amount on an already bankrupt nation. Troop levels are on the rise, as well as casualties.

The Obama administration is not willing to accept defeat, at any level. Things could only get worse before they get better. With the majority of the people against the war, and unfavorable poll numbers toward President Obama, many are left questioning what the administration will do next.